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Abstract 
 
In this paper, we aim to assess how a specific socio-institutional environment, identified 
according to the level of corruption, may affect the access to credit for micro, small, and 
medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs). Using a sample of 68,115 observations – drawn from 
the ECB-SAFE survey – related to MSMEs chartered in 11 euro area countries during the 
period 2009–2014, we investigate whether the level of corruption affects their demand for 
bank loans.  
 
Overall, we find that the degree of corruption seems to play a role in the applications for 
bank loans when small firms are under investigation. Interestingly, results highlight that small 
businesses chartered in highly corrupt countries face a greater probability of self-restraint 
regarding their loan applications (about 7.4%) than small firms located in low-corruption 
economies (around 6%). The results are robust to various model specifications and 
econometric methodologies. Our findings suggest that anti-corruption policies and measures 
enhancing transparency in the economy may be crucial in reducing the negative spillovers 
generated by a low-quality institutional environment on the access to credit by small firms. 
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1. INTRODUCTION AND RELATED LITERATURE 
Bank credit is a crucial financing tool for the development of micro, small, and medium-
sized enterprises (MSMEs), given their difficulties in easily entering the equity markets 
(Ayadi and Gadi 2013; Kremp and Sevestre 2013; Vermoesen, Deloof, and Laveren 
2013). However, the access to bank credit is not as easy as one might think. 
Specifically, MSMEs often come into trouble when they have to provide good collateral 
for the loan officers (Cowan, Drexler, and Yañez 2015; Öztürk and Mrkaic 2014; Vos  
et al. 2007). Additionally, in times of crisis – like the one that recently occurred in 
Europe – liquidity shortages and credit restrictions further weaken the access to bank 
loans for MSMEs (Popov and Van Horen 2015; Popov and Udell 2012). This is not 
inconsequential, given that MSMEs are important drivers of the European economy. 
Indeed, they represent 99% of nonfinancial firms in the European Union (EU), provide 
jobs for more than 91 million people (67% of employment in the EU), and generate 
about 60% of the total added value of the entire Union (EIF, 2016). 
Apart from the economic and financial features, the quality of the institutional 
environment may play an important role in affecting the credit market in many regards. 
A vast branch of the empirical literature has shown that some factors such as the 
efficiency in the enforcement of legal rights – i.e., creditor rights protection and judicial 
enforcement (La Porta et al. 1997; Qian and Strahan 2007; Djankov et al. 2008;  
Moro, Maresch, and Ferrando 2016; Galli, Mascia, and Rossi 2017) – and the 
competitiveness of the bank market (Cavalluzzo, Cavalluzzo, and Wolken 2002) play a 
role in the credit market, thereby affecting MSMEs’ loan applications. Little literature 
exists, however, about the effects of corruption on MSMEs’ access to bank credit. This 
is particularly unfortunate given that corruption is considered a major obstacle to 
economic growth (see, among others, Myrdal 1989; Andvig and Moene 1990; Shleifer 
and Vishny 1993; Mauro 1995; Keefer and Knack 1997; Hall and Jones 1999; La Porta 
et al. 1999; Li, Xu, and Zou 2000; Gyimah-Brempong 2002; Tanzi and Davoodi  
2002; Kaufmann 2005; Blackburn and Sarmah 2008; World Bank 2007; World Bank 
various years). More specifically, corruption mainly acts as a barrier to competition, 
reduces both domestic and foreign private investments, misallocates public resources  
– negatively affecting the efficiency of public investments – and reduces the level of 
trust in the institutions (Hunt 2005; Hunt and Laszlo 2005). In particular, some papers 
(e.g., Bhagwati 1982; Campos, Estrin, and Proto 2010; Svensson 2003) emphasize 
that in a highly corrupt environment, bribes represent a barrier to entry, especially for 
the micro, small, and medium firms, because the scarcity of their financial resources, 
the lower bargaining power, and the difficulty in accessing bank credit make it very 
difficult for them to refuse the payment of bribes. In other words, the burden per output 
is obviously greater for MSMEs than for the large companies and multinationals 
(Gbetnkom 2012; Seker and Yang 2012). In contrast, social capital supposedly 
stimulates the opposite mechanisms in the credit market. By increasing the level of 
trust and reducing the asymmetric information characterizing credit contracts, social 
capital improves the credit conditions for firms – thereby easing their access to bank 
loans (Uzzi 1999; Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2004; Moro and Fink 2013; Mistrulli 
and Vacca 2014) – and facilitates the collection of soft information, which in turn 
reduces adverse selection and moral hazard phenomena.  
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Therefore, while social capital allows a more efficient allocation of the resources in the 
credit market by reducing transaction costs, corruption negatively affects the business 
environment, diminishing the level of horizontal and vertical trust and producing 
uncertainty. However, to the best of our knowledge, the literature still lacks empirical 
contributions regarding the effect that corruption has on the access to bank credit  
of MSMEs. 
Our paper aims to include corruption among the determinants of the MSMEs’ access  
to bank credit on the demand side, using a sample of 68,115 observations – drawn 
from the ECB-SAFE1 – related to MSMEs chartered in 11 euro area countries during 
the period 2009–2014 (i.e., from the first to the twelfth wave of the survey). We  
add to the literature by empirically analyzing whether and to what extent corruption 
affects the access to bank credit for small firms. Interestingly, we perform our tests  
on a sample whose initial years are characterized by financial turbulence and heavy 
credit restrictions.  
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we illustrate the data and the 
methodology. In Section 3, we discuss the steps of our empirical strategy and comment 
on the results. Section 4 draws some conclusions. 
2. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
2.1 Data Description 
Most of the data that we use in the paper comes from the SAFE, which is jointly run by 
the European Central Bank (ECB) and the European Commission (EC) and has been 
conducted every six months since 2009 with the aim of collecting economic and 
financial information about European MSMEs. Each wave of the survey is addressed to 
a randomly selected sample of nonfinancial enterprises from the Dun & Bradstreet 
business register; firms in agriculture, public administration, and financial services, 
however, are deliberately excluded.   
We conduct our tests on a subsample of enterprises chartered in the 11 largest euro 
area economies (i.e., Austria, Belgium, France, Finland, Germany, Greece, Italy, 
Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain), where the differences in the micro and 
macroeconomic features, as well as in the socio-institutional environment, are relevant.  
All the macrodata that we employ as control variables in our regressions are retrieved 
from different sources (i.e., Heritage Foundation, Worldwide Governance Indicators, 
OECD, ECB Data Warehouse, World Bank). 
Therefore, our sample consists of 68,115 firm observations and is stratified by  
country, firm size, and activity. Table 1.a shows the distribution of our observations  
by country, with France, Germany, Spain, and Italy exhibiting the highest sample 
representativeness. Table 1.b, on the other hand, displays the distribution of our 
sample observations by firm size. 
  
1  Survey on the Access to Finance of Enterprises (SAFE): https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/money/ 
surveys/sme/html/index.en.html  
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Table 1.a: Observations by Country 
 Observations 
Country Name Freq. % 
Austria 4,101 6.02 
Belgium 4,075 5.98 
Finland 3,787 5.56 
France 9,991 14.67 
Germany 9,950 14.61 
Greece 4,088 6.00 
Ireland 3,708 5.44 
Italy 9,930 14.58 
Netherlands 4,239 6.22 
Portugal 4,288 6.30 
Spain 9,958 14.62 
Total 68,115 100.00 
Table 1.b: Observations by Firm Size 
 Observations 
Firm Size Freq. % 
Micro (up to 9 employees) 22,921 33.65 
Small (between 10 and 49 employees) 22,730 33.37 
Medium (between 50 and 249 employees) 17,287 25.38 
Large (more than 250 employees) 5,177 7.60 
Total 68,115 100.00 
2.2 Dependent and Key Variables 
In order to assess whether corruption affects the access to bank credit of small firms, 
we employ question “q7a_a” of the survey as a dependent variable (especially in the 
first and third stage of our analysis). In particular, the question is aimed at detecting 
whether a firm applied for bank loans, and if not, the reasons why it did not. More 
specifically, the question is: 
“[With regards to bank loans], could you please indicate whether you: (1) 
applied for any over the past 6 months; (2) did not apply because you thought 
you would be rejected; (3) did not apply because you had sufficient internal 
funds; or (4) did not apply for other reasons” 
The values from 1 to 4, outlined in parentheses, represent the way each respondent’s 
answers were coded. 
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In the second stage of our investigation, we employ a dummy called Fear as a 
dependent variable. This dummy is generated by utilizing information from answer (2) 
of the above-mentioned question q7a_a – hence taking a value of 1 when an enterprise 
did not apply for fear of rejection, and 0 when a firm did not apply for other reasons. 
Then we identify two key variables for our analyses, namely the size of the firm and the 
country’s level of corruption. The former is measured with a dummy (Small) that is 
equal to 1 when a firm has fewer than 50 employees, and 0 otherwise. As regards the 
latter, it is worth noting that the literature recognizes a variety of measures that proxy 
for corruption: perception-based indicators, experience-based indicators, and objective 
measures such as the number of corruption-related trials or cases (Gutmann, 
Padovano, and Voigt 2014). In this paper, we decide to employ two alternatively 
comparable survey measures, namely Freedom from corruption (drawn from  
the Heritage Foundation) – whose score is primarily derived from Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI) – and Control of corruption 
(Worldwide Governance Indicators), which are both available for all countries and on a 
yearly basis. 
With regards to firm size, Figure 1 reports the percentage of small firms in our sample, 
by country. Interestingly, we note that in Belgium, Finland, Greece, and Ireland small 
firms cover more than 75% of all firm observations. 
Figure 2 and Figure 3, on the other hand, show the average value of the two corruption 
indicators employed in our analyses, by country. For the sake of clarity, please note 
that the higher (lower) the value shown for each indicator, the lower (higher) the level of 
corruption in that country. 
Figure 1: Percentage of Small Firms by Country 
 
AT = Austria, BE = Belgium, DE = Germany, ES = Spain, FI = Finland, FR = France,  
GR = Greece, IE = Ireland, IT = Italy, NL = The Netherlands, PT = Portugal. 
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Figure 2: Freedom from Corruption by Country 
 
AT = Austria, BE = Belgium, DE = Germany, ES = Spain, FI = Finland, FR = France,  
GR = Greece, IE = Ireland, IT = Italy, NL = The Netherlands, PT = Portugal. 
Figure 3: Control of Corruption by Country 
 
AT = Austria, BE = Belgium, DE = Germany, ES = Spain, FI = Finland, FR = France,  
GR = Greece, IE = Ireland, IT = Italy, NL = The Netherlands, PT = Portugal. 
  
5 
 
ADBI Working Paper 756 Galli, Mascia, and Rossi 
 
Finally, Figure 4 depicts a picture of the level of corruption in the euro area through the 
use of a map. More specifically, based on the “Freedom from corruption” indicator, we 
assign different colors to the countries in our sample according to their perceived 
degree of corruption. In particular, we employ the following scale of colors to highlight 
the territories from the most to the least corrupt ones: red, orange, yellow, light green, 
and dark green. For instance, countries in red (i.e., Greece and Italy) represent the 
most corrupt economies. In contrast, areas in dark green (i.e., Finland and the 
Netherlands) are the least corrupt ones. 
Figure 4: Map Depicting the Degree of Corruption in our Sample 
 
Source = Map customized by the authors, according to the degree of corruption provided by the Heritage Foundation. 
2.3 Econometric Strategy and Control Variables 
The hypothesis under investigation is the following: 
H1: Where corruption is higher, small firms are more likely to refrain from applying for 
bank loans than larger firms.  
We test our hypothesis with the following model [1]: 
Pi (applying for loans) = f (small firms, corruption, firm controls,  
macro, country, wave) [1] 
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The specification includes standard firm controls such as age; sector (construction, 
manufacturing, mining, wholesale); financial firm controls, such as change in leverage, 
capital, profitability, and credit history; and macro controls such as GDP growth, the 
Herfindahl Index (HI) of bank concentration, nonperforming loans over gross loans 
(NPL ratio), and a dummy that captures the expansionary monetary policy phase that 
followed the Outright Monetary Transaction (OMT) announcement by the ECB. Finally, 
we use country and time dummies as additional controls. 
We perform our analysis in three steps. First we estimate equation [1] by employing  
a multinomial logit model as in Demirguc-Kunt, Klapper, and Singer (2013) and  
Badoer and James (2016), because: i) our dependent variable is a discrete one, given 
that it takes more than two outcomes and the outcomes have no natural ordering  
(see description in Section 2.2); ii) it is suitable for the use of continuous variables and 
multiple categorical variables as regressors. 
Secondly, we test model [1] by employing our Fear dummy as a dependent variable 
through the use of logit models, and further corroborate our findings with a series of 
robustness checks that we carry out via Heckman selection models. 
Table 2: Summary Statistics 
 Observations Mean Median St. Dev. p1 p99 
Dependent variables       
q7a_a 68,115 2.626 3.000 1.094 1.000 4.000 
Fear 50,096 0.083 0.000 0.276 0.000 1.000 
Key variable       
Small 68,115 0.670 1.000 0.470 0.000 1.000 
Country-level controls       
Freedom from corruption 68,115 67.588 69.000 15.489 34.000 94.000 
Control of corruption 68,115 1.187 1.420 0.712 –0.250 2.220 
GDP Growth 68,115 –0.620 0.050 2.934 –8.200 5.050 
Concentration 68,115 0.088 0.060 0.077 0.021 0.370 
NPL 68,115 7.101 4.295 6.254 0.500 31.899 
OMT 68,115 0.437 0.000 0.496 0.000 1.000 
Firm-level controls       
Profit up 68,115 0.238 0.000 0.426 0.000 1.000 
Profit down 68,115 0.472 0.000 0.499 0.000 1.000 
Credit up 68,115 0.204 0.000 0.403 0.000 1.000 
Credit down 68,115 0.142 0.000 0.349 0.000 1.000 
Capital up 68,115 0.243 0.000 0.429 0.000 1.000 
Capital down 68,115 0.204 0.000 0.403 0.000 1.000 
Leverage up 68,115 0.207 0.000 0.405 0.000 1.000 
Leverage down 68,115 0.276 0.000 0.447 0.000 1.000 
Demand up 68,031 0.191 0.000 0.393 0.000 1.000 
Demand down 68,031 0.131 0.000 0.337 0.000 1.000 
Very recent 68,115 0.020 0.000 0.139 0.000 1.000 
Recent 68,115 0.069 0.000 0.253 0.000 1.000 
Old 68,115 0.128 0.000 0.334 0.000 1.000 
Construction 68,115 0.100 0.000 0.300 0.000 1.000 
Manufacturing 68,115 0.255 0.000 0.436 0.000 1.000 
Wholesale/Retail 68,115 0.337 0.000 0.473 0.000 1.000 
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Finally, we repeat our multinomial logit estimations by splitting the sample into low- and 
high-corruption areas in order to check whether the behavior of small firms changes 
according to the level of a country’s corruption. 
All regressions include time and country dummies. Calibrated weights are employed to 
adjust the sample to be representative of the population (as in Ferrando, Popov, and 
Udell 2017). Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity, and clustered at the 
country-level, to remove possible bias in the estimations. 
Table 2 shows the summary statistics of the variables employed in our analysis. 
Table A1 in the Appendix, meanwhile, provides descriptions of variables and sources. 
3. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
3.1 Multinomial Logit Models – Full Sample 
The empirical results of our estimations regarding the likelihood that small firms will 
apply for bank loans are presented in Table 3. Following the assumptions of the 
multinomial logit methodology, here we set the first answer to question q7a_a  
(i.e., “applied”) as our base outcome. Panel A (B) reports the estimate of model [1] 
when we control for corruption as proxied by Freedom from corruption (Control of 
corruption). Estimated marginal effects are reported in brackets. 
Table 3: Bank Loan Applications: Multinomial Logit Model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Applied Did_not_apply_fear Did_not_apply_suff Did_not_apply_other 
Panel A     
Small (base) 1.034*** 0.363*** 0.528*** 
  (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) 
  [0.064]   
Freedom from 
Corruption 
 –0.079** –0.025*** –0.009 
 (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) 
SAFE Controls YES YES YES YES 
Observations 68,115 68,115 68,115 68,115 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0752 0.0752 0.0752 0.0752 
Panel B     
Small (base) 1.031*** 0.361*** 0.527*** 
  (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) 
  [0.065]   
Control of Corruption  –1.764* –0.746*** –0.893** 
  (0.96) (0.22) (0.35) 
SAFE Controls YES YES YES YES 
Observations 68,115 68,115 68,115 68,115 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0749 0.0749 0.0749 0.0749 
Note: This table shows regression results of the multinomial logit model regarding the likelihood that small firms do not 
apply for bank loans. The dependent variable – which is also described in Section 2.2 – equals 1/2/3/4 if a firm 
applied/did not apply because of possible rejection/did not apply because of sufficient internal funds/did not apply for 
other reasons during the past six months, respectively. Small is a dummy that equals 1 if the firm has fewer than  
50 employees, and 0 otherwise. Regressions control for “Freedom from corruption” (“Control of corruption”) in Panel A 
(B). Though not showing, both specifications include a wide set of firm-level characteristics. See Table A1 in the 
Appendix for all variable definitions and sources. All regressions use sampling weights that adjust the sample to be 
representative of the population. Additionally, all regressions include time and country dummies. Heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors, clustered at the country level, appear in parentheses. Estimated marginal effects are reported in 
brackets. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. 
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Overall, we see that – after having controlled for a wide set of firm characteristics  
– small firms are about 6.5% more likely than their larger counterparts to refrain from 
applying for bank loans due to fear of rejection (Column 2). Interestingly, we also note 
that the two proxies for corruption show a negative and significant coefficient – thereby 
signaling that a lower level of corruption in a country translates into a lower probability 
of refraining from applying for fear of rejection. In other words, our result anticipates 
that the share of discouraged borrowers should be lower when the quality of the 
economic environment is higher (i.e., when the degree of corruption is low). 
3.2 Logit Models – Fear of Rejection 
As a second step of our investigation, we test our hypothesis by employing logit models 
and we further corroborate our findings through a series of robustness checks carried 
out via Heckman selection models. More specifically, to estimate equation [1] we now 
employ the dummy Fear (already described in Section 2.2) as a dependent variable. 
Results are reported in Table 4 and Table 5, where we employ Freedom from 
corruption and Control of corruption as proxies for corruption, respectively. 
Moreover, the regressions displayed in both Table 4 and Table 5 vary, among the 
different columns, because of the progressive inclusion of the country-level controls 
(Column 2), and the interaction term with the proxy of corruption (Column 3). 
Table 4: Logit Model – with Freedom from Corruption 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Fear Fear Fear 
Small 0.632*** 0.634*** 0.081 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.30) 
Freedom from Corruption –0.067** –0.049 –0.055 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
Small x Freedom from Corruption   0.008** 
   (0.00) 
GDP Growth  0.081 0.081 
  (0.06) (0.06) 
Concentration  –13.519* –13.551* 
  (7.98) (7.98) 
NPL  0.081*** 0.081*** 
  (0.03) (0.03) 
OMT  –0.507*** –0.505*** 
  (0.16) (0.16) 
SAFE Controls YES YES YES 
Observations 50,096 50,096 50,096 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0984 0.101 0.102 
Note: This table shows regression results of the logit model regarding the likelihood that small firms do not apply for 
bank loans for fear of rejection. The dependent variable (Fear) – which is also described in Section 2.2 – is a dummy 
that equals 1 if a firm did not apply because of possible rejection, and 0 otherwise. Small is a dummy that equals 1 if the 
firm has fewer than 50 employees, and 0 otherwise. Though not showing, all the models include a wide set of firm-level 
characteristics. See Table A1 in the Appendix for all variable definitions and sources. All regressions use sampling 
weights that adjust the sample to be representative of the population. Additionally, all regressions include time and 
country dummies. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered at the country level, appear in parentheses.  
*** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. 
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The results from Table 4 highlight that – in line with the findings previously obtained 
with the multilogit analysis – small firms refrain from applying for bank loans for fear  
of rejection, as they anticipate a negative response from the lender. The variable 
Freedom from corruption presents a negative and significant sign suggesting  
that, when the level of corruption is lower, firms may experience a lower probability  
of self-restraint. Interestingly, the interaction between size and corruption shows a 
positive and significant sign. For this reason, we decide to plot the probability that a 
small firm does not apply for fear of rejection, for different levels of corruption (see 
Figure 5). Figure 5 shows that the higher the freedom from corruption (i.e., the lower 
the corruption), the lower the probability that small firms will not apply for a bank loan 
for fear of seeing their application rejected. Put another way, the lower the corruption, 
lower the share of discouraged borrowers. 
Figure 5: Marginal Effect of Small Firms Not Applying for Fear of Rejection  
for Different Levels of Corruption (As Proxied by Freedom from Corruption) 
 
We now try to corroborate our findings by employing a different proxy of corruption, 
namely Control of corruption. The results, reported in Table 5, are consistent with 
those presented in Table 4. Namely, we find that small firms  
refrain from applying for bank loans, and we also see that corruption influences their 
financing strategy. 
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Table 5: Logit Model – with Control of Corruption 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variables Fear Fear Fear 
Small 0.627*** 0.633*** 0.409*** 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.13) 
Control of Corruption –0.998 –0.664 –0.798 
 (1.04) (0.70) (0.69) 
Small x Control of Corruption   0.176** 
   (0.08) 
GDP Growth  0.057 0.056 
  (0.04) (0.04) 
Concentration  –12.582 –12.622 
  (8.67) (8.68) 
NPL  0.106*** 0.106*** 
  (0.04) (0.04) 
OMT  –0.591*** –0.589*** 
  (0.15) (0.15) 
SAFE Controls YES YES YES 
Observations 50,096 50,096 50,096 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0964 0.101 0.101 
Note: This table shows regression results of the logit model regarding the likelihood that small firms do not apply for 
bank loans for fear of rejection. The dependent variable (Fear) – which is also described in Section 2.2 – is a dummy 
that equals 1 if a firm did not apply because of possible rejection, and 0 otherwise. Small is a dummy that equals 1 if the 
firm has fewer than 50 employees, and 0 otherwise. Though not showing, all the models include a wide set of firm-level 
characteristics. See Table A1 in the Appendix for all variable definitions and sources. All regressions use sampling 
weights that adjust the sample to be representative of the population. Additionally, all regressions include time and 
country dummies. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered at the country level, appear in parentheses.  
*** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. 
As for the marginal effects, Figure 6 plots the probability that a small firm does not 
apply for fear of rejection, for different levels of corruption (as proxied by Control  
of corruption). The results – in this case too – show that the lower the degree of 
corruption, the lower the fear of rejection experienced by small firms. 
3.3 Robustness Checks: Heckman Selection Models 
In this section we present further robustness checks. Because the tests in Section 3.2 
(i.e., logit models) have been conducted on a sample of firms that did not apply for 
bank loans (thereby excluding those who applied), one might raise concerns that our 
results are affected by a sample selection bias. To overcome this potential criticism, we 
re-estimate our models following the Heckman (1979) approach, which requires us to 
specify a selection equation that includes a set of variables affecting the possibility of 
observing the phenomenon but not the outcome itself. The results are displayed in 
Table 6 and Table 7 and corroborate our previous findings.  
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Figure 6: Marginal Effect of Small Firms Not Applying for Fear of Rejection  
for Different Levels of Corruption (As Proxied by Control of Corruption) 
 
Table 6: Heckman Selection Model – with Freedom from Corruption 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Fear Fear Fear 
Regression equation    
Small 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.003 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
Freedom from Corruption –0.003*** –0.001* –0.001** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Small x Freedom from Corruption   0.000** 
   (0.00) 
GDP Growth  0.001 0.001 
  (0.00) (0.00) 
Concentration  –0.437*** –0.433*** 
  (0.13) (0.13) 
NPL  0.005*** 0.005*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) 
OMT  –0.029*** –0.029*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) 
SAFE Controls YES YES YES 
continued on next page 
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Table 6 continued 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Fear Fear Fear 
Selection equation    
Demand up –1.364*** –1.364*** –1.364*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
    
Lambda (Mills ratio) 0.216*** 0.214*** 0.214*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Observations 72,372 72,372 72,372 
Prob > chi2 0 0 0 
Note: This table shows regression results of the Heckman selection model regarding the likelihood that small firms do 
not apply for bank loans for fear of rejection. The dependent variable (Fear) – which is also described in Section 2.2 – is 
a dummy that equals 1 if a firm did not apply because of possible rejection, and 0 otherwise. Small is a dummy that 
equals 1 if the firm has fewer than 50 employees, and 0 otherwise. Though not showing, all the models include a wide 
set of firm-level characteristics. See Table A1 in the Appendix for all variable definitions and sources. All regressions 
use sampling weights that adjust the sample to be representative of the population. Additionally, all regressions include 
time and country dummies. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered at the country level, appear in 
parentheses. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. 
Table 7: Heckman Selection Model – with Control of Corruption 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Fear Fear Fear 
Regression equation    
Small 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.017*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
Control of Corruption –0.042** –0.019 –0.025 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Small x Control of Corruption   0.008** 
   (0.00) 
GDP Growth  0.001 0.001 
  (0.00) (0.00) 
Concentration  –0.363*** –0.362*** 
  (0.12) (0.12) 
NPL  0.005*** 0.005*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) 
OMT  –0.030*** –0.030*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) 
SAFE Controls YES YES YES 
Selection equation    
Demand up –1.364*** –1.364*** –1.364*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Lambda (Mills ratio) 0.216*** 0.214*** 0.214*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Observations 72,372 72,372 72,372 
Prob > chi2 0 0 0 
Note: This table shows regression results of the Heckman selection model regarding the likelihood that small firms do 
not apply for bank loans for fear of rejection. The dependent variable (Fear) – which is also described in Section 2.2 – is 
a dummy that equals 1 if a firm did not apply because of possible rejection, and 0 otherwise. Small is a dummy that 
equals 1 if the firm has fewer than 50 employees, and 0 otherwise. Though not showing, all the models include a wide 
set of firm-level characteristics. See Table A1 in the Appendix for all variable definitions and sources. All regressions 
use sampling weights that adjust the sample to be representative of the population. Additionally, all regressions include 
time and country dummies. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered at the country level, appear in 
parentheses. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. 
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3.4 Further Analysis: Multinomial Logit Models – Sample Split 
by Corruption  
In this section we discuss the results obtained when estimating our equation [1] for two 
subsamples that we get by splitting the initial data set into low- and high-corruption 
areas. Indeed, after having calculated the mean level of Freedom from corruption 
across the full sample, we are able to build two distinct clusters that distinguish  
the low-corruption countries (observations above the mean) from the high-corruption 
ones (observations below the mean). 2 The results of our estimations are tabulated  
in Table 8. 
Table 8: Bank Loan Applications – Multinomial Logit Model  
– Sample Split by Corruption 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Applied Did_not_apply_fear Did_not_apply_suff Did_not_apply_other 
Panel A: Low corruption    
Small (base) 1.061*** 0.333** 0.543*** 
  (0.09) (0.13) (0.12) 
  [0.062]   
SAFE Controls YES YES YES YES 
Observations 36,907 36,907 36,907 36,907 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0677 0.0677 0.0677 0.0677 
Panel B: High corruption    
Small (base) 0.947*** 0.461*** 0.574*** 
  (0.17) (0.03) (0.06) 
  [0.074]   
SAFE Controls YES YES YES YES 
Observations 25,739 25,739 25,739 25,739 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0713 0.0713 0.0713 0.0713 
Note: This table shows regression results of the multinomial logit model regarding the likelihood that small firms do not 
apply for bank loans. The dependent variable – which is also described in Section 2.2 – equals 1/2/3/4 if a firm 
applied/did not apply because of possible rejection/did not apply because of sufficient internal funds/did not apply for 
other reasons during the past six months, respectively. Small is a dummy that equals 1 if the firm has fewer than  
50 employees, and 0 otherwise. Table A (B) reports regressions on a subsample of firms chartered in low- (high-) 
corruption countries. Though not showing, both specifications include a wide set of firm-level characteristics. See 
Table A1 in the Appendix for all variable definitions and sources. All regressions use sampling weights that adjust the 
sample to be representative of the population. Additionally, all regressions include time and country dummies. 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered at the country level, appear in parentheses. Estimated marginal 
effects are reported in brackets. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. 
More specifically, Table 8 presents the coefficients and the marginal effects of our key 
variable (Small firms) in the economies characterized by lower (Panel A) and higher 
(Panel B) levels of corruption. In both cases, the results in Column 2 confirm the 
evidence previously found in the overall sample – namely, small firms (in both regional 
clusters) are more likely not to apply for fear of rejection than larger enterprises. In 
particular, small firms are 7.4% (6.2%) more likely than their larger peers to refrain from 
applying for a bank loan for fear of rejection in high- (low-) corruption economies. 
 
2  For the sake of clarity, the high-corruption countries are Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. The low-
corruption nations are  Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, and the Netherlands. In 
this regard, see Figure 4 that shows the degree of freedom from corruption by country. 
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4. CONCLUSIONS 
The global financial crisis worsened the conditions of access to the credit market for 
enterprises in Europe. Therefore, improving access to bank credit, especially for 
MSMEs, becomes important to safeguard the survival and development of their 
businesses. In this paper, we have attempted to assess how the level of corruption  
– combined with several economic and financial features – affected the access to credit 
for MSMEs during our observed period. 
To this end, we employed a sample of 68,115 observations – drawn from the ECB-
SAFE survey – related to MSMEs chartered in 11 euro area countries during the period 
2009–2014. The level of corruption seems to play a role in the behavior of small firms 
in the credit market since they are more likely to refrain – especially in high-corruption 
areas – from applying for bank loans than their larger peers.  
Interestingly, results indicate that small firms chartered in high-corruption countries are 
more likely to refrain from applying for loans (more than 7.4%) than small firms located 
in low-corruption economies (about 6.2%).  
Results are robust to different specifications and econometric methodologies. 
Overall, our findings advise that policymakers should intervene in most corrupt areas in 
order to limit the aforementioned negative spillovers and to support the access to bank 
credit for small firms. 
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APPENDIX 
Table A1: Variable Descriptions and Sources 
Variables Description Source 
Dependent 
variables 
  
Bank loan – 
application 
Variable that equals one/two/three/four if (considering bank loans) a firm 
applied/did not apply because of possible rejection/did not apply because of 
sufficient internal funds/did not apply for other reasons during the past six 
months, respectively. 
ECB: SAFE 
Fear Variable that equals one if a firm did not apply for a bank loan because of 
possible rejection during the past six months. 
ECB: SAFE 
Key variables   
Small firms Dummy variable that equals one if the firm has fewer than 50 employees. ECB: SAFE 
Country-level 
controls 
  
Freedom from 
corruption 
The higher the level of corruption, the lower the level of overall economic 
freedom and the lower a country’s score. 
Heritage 
Foundation 
Control of 
corruption 
The higher the level of corruption, the lower a country’s score. World 
Bank: WGI 
GDP Growth The annual growth rate of real GDP based on averages of quarterly data for 
each survey round. 
OECD 
Concentration The Herfindahl index (HI) of total assets concentration (for the banking 
sector). 
ECB: Data 
Warehouse 
NPL The ratio of bank nonperforming loans to total gross loans. World Bank 
OMT Dummy variable that equals one from the year of announcement (2012) of 
the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) program. 
Our 
calculation 
Firm-level 
controls 
  
Profit up Dummy variable that equals one if a firm experienced an increase of the net 
income after taxes in the past six months. 
ECB: SAFE 
Profit down Dummy variable that equals one if a firm experienced a decrease of the net 
income after taxes in the past six months. 
ECB: SAFE 
Creditworthiness 
up 
Dummy variable that equals one if the firm’s credit history improved in the 
past six months. 
ECB: SAFE 
Creditworthiness 
down 
Dummy variable that equals one if the firm’s credit history worsened in the 
past six months. 
ECB: SAFE 
Capital up Dummy variable that equals one if a firm’s own capital has improved in the 
past six months. 
ECB: SAFE 
Capital down Dummy variable that equals one if a firm’s own capital has deteriorated in 
the past six months. 
ECB: SAFE 
Leverage up Dummy variable that equals one if a firm experienced an increase in the 
debt-to-assets ratio in the past six months. 
ECB: SAFE 
Leverage down Dummy variable that equals one if a firm experienced a decrease in the 
debt-to-assets ratio in the past six months. 
ECB: SAFE 
Demand up Dummy variable that equals one if a firm’s needs for a bank loan increased 
in the past six months. 
ECB: SAFE 
Demand down Dummy variable that equals one if a firm’s needs for a bank loan decreased 
in the past six months. 
ECB: SAFE 
Very recent Dummy variable that equals one if the firm is less than 2 years old. ECB: SAFE 
Recent Dummy variable that equals one if the firm is between 2 and 5 years old. ECB: SAFE 
Old Dummy variable that equals one if the firm is between 5 and 10 years old. ECB: SAFE 
Construction Dummy variable that equals one if the firm’s main activity is construction. ECB: SAFE 
Manufacturing Dummy variable that equals one if the firm’s main activity is manufacturing. ECB: SAFE 
Wholesale/Retail Dummy variable that equals one if the firm’s main activity is wholesale or 
retail trade. 
ECB: SAFE 
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